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Afghanistan’s Future: Foreign and Local 
Solutions for a Fought-Over Country   
Alain Hanssen 
In this policy brief, Alain Hanssen looks at 
Afghanistan's  future  through  different 
national and international lenses. 
In the aftermath of the international conference 
in  Bonn  and  during  a  time  when  peace  talks 
have seemed about to start for ages, it is useful 
to summarise various governments’ views about 
their preferred political future for a state that in 
recent years has mobilised enormous amounts 
of  energy  and  motivated  numerous  speeches, 
seminars,  conferences,  development 
programmes,  and  – o f  c o u r s e  –  military 
interventions.  Even  if  it  is  primarly  for  the 
Afghans  themselves to make peace with each 
other, neigbouring countries also have a major 
influence  on  events  there.  It  is  important  to 
stress that their country has long been the focus 
of  competition  between  major  and  lesser 
powers.  In  the  tradition  of  the  Great  Game 
between the UK and Russia in the nineteenth 
and  twentieth  centuries,  other  countries  have 
also  come  to  reveal  a  series  of  hegemonic 
ambitions  in  regard  to  Afghanistan.  These 
include  the  competition  between  India  and 
Pakistan and the reciprocal demonization of the 
US  and  Iran,  at  least  during  the  G.W.  Bush 
administration. 
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A  Switzerland  in  the  Shadow  of  the 
Hindu Kush 
From the Western perspective, and particularly 
from  that  of  its  most  accomplished  and 
humanistic  version,  which  I  call  our 
Scandinavian  utopia,  the  goal  is  a  modernised 
Afghanistan that is at peace, democratised, and 
decriminalised.  Its  purpose  is  apparently  to 
erase forever from our TV screens the horrible 
images of the country under Taliban rule, with 
its  brutal  theocracy,  its  unprecedented 
violence, its summary justice, and its reducing 
of  women  and  children  to  the  status  of 
merchandise. 
 
Westerners,  especially  those  in  Protestant 
countries,  tend  to  feel  that  they  have  a 
mission. They strongly support anything that 
can  move  Afghanistan  towards  modernity, 
such  as  building  democratic  institutions, 
establishing  such  credible  political 
counterbalances as a parliament, independent 
media,  and  NGOs,  achieving  administrative 
and  political  decentralisation,  making  a  huge 
effort in regard to education and training, and 
establishing  the  infrastructure  that  will  allow 
all this to work. They also tend to imagine that 
they can ward off poverty, the isolation of the 
valleys,  and  the  ubiquitous  poppy,  that  they 
can help bring about a bright and pluralistic 
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future  coloured  with  saffron,  pistachio,  and 
pomegranate, and bring the country back into 
having  a  legitimate  economy.  The  objectives 
are, however, somewhat different on each side 
of the Atlantic. 
 
Erase the Humiliation of 9/11 
For the power that decided in 2001 to engage 
in  armed  action  in  Afghanistan  in  pursuit  of 
Osama  Bin  Laden,  his  death  in  2011 
significantly reduces its reasons for maintaining 
a  massive  presence  there.  It  is  impossible, 
furthermore, to accept the mere hypothesis that 
sanctuaries of international terrorism are likely 
to flourish again in Afghanistan, where the US 
has during the past 10 years lost 1,500 soldiers 
and spent nearly half a trillion dollars. Most of 
the other powers also have the same interests. 
This leads them to moderate their criticism of 
the US, which is likely to provide from four to 
five military bases, including Bagram, vigorous 
intelligence  work,  and  regular  policing  of  the 
country.  
 
The US has, however, a wider regional interest 
in  maintaining  military  bases  in  Afghanistan, 
albeit ones that are temporary – as are those it 
established  in  Korea  six  decades  ago.  They 
provide  a  powerful  capability  for  the 
surveillance of Pakistan, Iran, and India, three 
countries  where  it  has  long  been  politically 
impossible  for  the  US  to  consider  having  a 
military presence. 
 
President  Obama’s  speech  of  22  June  2011 
announcing  the  military  withdrawal  made  no 
reference  to  the  armies  of  American 
agronomists  and  teachers  who  a  year  earlier 
were  going  to  come  to  Afghanistan  to  help 
develop it. The US budget deficit is widening. 
Generous  and  visionary  policies  aimed  at 
winning people’s hearts and minds have yet to 
produce even a fraction of the expected results. 
The current goals are therefore more modest 
and  more  immediately  related  to  the  national 
interest. 
The evolution on our side of the Atlantic is 
similar. Given the disappointing results on the 
ground  despite  all  the  money  spent,  all  the 
brains  engaged,  and  all  the  human  lives 
offered, the so-called Helvetic paradise in the 
shadow of the Hindu Kush about which the 
leaders  in  some  of  the  capitals  in  northern 
Europe  dreamed  has  gradually  become 
downgraded  in  their  planning  towards  what 
might be called a Bosnian minimum, or merely 
an  honourable  exit  from  the  conflict. 
Europeans would now tend to be delighted if 
by 2014 they could expect an Afghan state that 
is  relatively  functional,  is  without  major 
terrorist  exports  or  secessionist  movements, 
that does not deny women’s rights and human 
rights  in  general  too  dramatically,  that  no 
longer  needs  a  permanent  and  massive 
Western presence, and that contains the most 
extreme  forms  of  local  socio-religious 
conservatism  –  mostly  Pashtun  –  within 
acceptable limits. 
 
The  Europeans,  even  the  British,  are  all  in 
trouble after 10 years of conflict into which the 
US  dragged  most  of  them  with  forced 
solidarity.  They  now  wish  to  reduce  their 
military presence in Afghanistan and replace it 
with one of support, training, and development 
assistance.  Northern  Europe  will  probably 
retain  such  a  support  presence  significantly. 
The Scandinavians, for example, are likely to 
continue  to  address  human  rights,  the 
Germans to train the police, and the British to 
support governance and institution-building. 
 
Pakistan is too Close 
With  its  conflict-centred  relationship  with 
India dominating its perspective, the Pakistani 
government continues to view Afghanistan as 
a  provider  of  strategic  depth.  Indeed, 
Pakistan’s territory is so narrow in its North 
that  invaders  from  the  east  could  cross  it 
completely  in  just  one  day.  Its  government 
therefore perceives a need for a fallback area 
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everything it can to ensure that the government 
in Kabul is both weak and an ally. 
 
In addition to this geostrategic imperative, a bit 
outdated in my view, no Afghan government 
has recognised – or is likely to recognise soon – 
the  Durand  Line  that  separates  the  two 
countries, as it divides the traditional territory 
of the Pashtuns, Afghanistan's dominant ethnic 
group, and which traditionally provides its head 
of  state.  It  also  unacceptably  carves  up  the 
original seventeenth-century Afghan kingdom. 
 
The  Pakistani  government  has  found  it 
necessary  since  2008  to  intervene  militarily 
against the Pakistani Taliban, because a group 
that  took  this  name  began  to  challenge  and 
harass it. This did not, however, fundamentally 
change the major political realities. During the 
1980s  the  Pakistani  intelligence  services  had, 
with the support of their American colleagues, 
encouraged the establishment of what became 
the Afghan Taliban. It should be noted that this 
national adjective designates the area of military 
activity  and  not  the  nationality  of  individual 
fighters.  Since  then  they  have  continued  to 
provide  them  with  financial  and  material 
support.  The  unwritten  rule  that  the  Afghan 
Taliban  does  not  need  to  worry  about  the 
Pakistani army as long as its terrorist activities 
remain  an  export  product  with  only  Afghan 
targets is apparently still in force. 
 
Pakistan’s  general  staff  is  currently  worried 
about  losing  its  control  of  Afghanistan  and 
about the US and India acquiring what in its 
view  is  too  much  influence  there.  Before 
supporting reconciliation in Afghanistan it set 
conditions  reminiscent  of  the  Syrian 
government’s recent policies toward Lebanon. 
They  have,  for  example,  recently  attempted 
unsuccessfully to impose a complete reversal of 
alliances on the Afghan government, in which 
Afghanistan would have quickly closed all US 
bases,  ended  its  cooperation  with  India,  and 
joined a Sino-Pakistani alliance. 
India: Hegemony, Trade, Stability 
India  is  one  of  the  strongest  allies  of 
Afghanistan‘s current president and his closest 
aides,  who  are  mostly  Tajik.  India  used  to 
support  Commander  Massoud,  and  more 
generally  supports  the  so-called  Northern 
Alliance, and continues to develop its economic 
ties with Afghanistan, to offer its citizens large 
numbers  of  scholarships,  to  help  diversify  its 
sources of access to the ocean, and to reduce its 
dependence on Pakistan for imports.  
 
From an Indian perspective the most desirable 
future  for  Afghanistan  would  be  that  of  a 
country  that  is  at  peace,  is  a  good  customer, 
maintains its alliance with India, eliminates or at 
least  greatly  weakens  the  Taliban,  keeps  the 
Pashtun and Baluchis in some sort of rebellion 
against Pakistan and out of Islamabad’s control, 
and generally serves as a reliable counterweight 
to  Pakistan.  The  anti-India  terrorist  group 
Lashkar-e-Toiba,  originally  an  almost 
exclusively  Kashmiri  phenomenon,  today  has 
cells in each of India’s neighbouring countries 
and  is  growing  at  an  alarming  rate  in 
Bangladesh. It is now reasonable to assume that 
the 2008 attacks on Mumbai may have indeed 
had  the  goal  that  the  Indian  authorities 
described  immediately  afterward,  that  of 
damaging the city’s and country’s embarrassing 
success  compared  to  the  failure  and  poverty 
that dominate the situation 800 km up the coast 
of the Arabian Sea. 
 
The  Indian  government  also  wants  an 
Afghanistan in which Islam is not too radical or 
internationalist, as except for the phenomenon 
of  Naxalites  Islamic  radicalism  is  the  main 
source  of  instability  in  the  Indian  federation. 
India  is  the  cradle  of  Deobandi  Islam,  and 
views with great concern the development that 
some of its Muslim citizens in Rajasthan, Bihar, 
and  Uttar  Pradesh  are  gradually  falling  under 
the influence of Salafist groups. 
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and its trade priority in regard to it, conducted 
by  the  state  that  represents  stability  and 
democracy  on  the  subcontinent,  have  many 
similarities  to  that  of  the  West,  which 
consequently sympathises with it. These policies 
have,  however,  a  significant  downside.  If 
Afghanistan  rather  than  Kashmir  were  to 
become confirmed as the main theatre for Indo-
Pakistani  rivalry  it  would  increase  Islamabad’s 
anti-Indian hysteria and reinforce its feelings of 
encirclement.  This  explains  why  the  Indian 
government has always prudently refused to get 
involved  in  the  NATO-coordinated 
International Security Assistance Force’s (ISAF) 
military effort. It is also perhaps what led it to 
announce in May 2011 that it no longer opposed 
the  reconciliation  process,  and  therefore  some 
form of return to power for the Taliban. 
 
China avoids involvement in Afghanistan other 
than  through  the  logical  consequences  of  the 
alliances mentioned earlier. It supports Pakistan 
against  India,  but  only  tepidly,  as  it  wants  to 
discourage Islamic fundamentalism, which could 
galvanise its own Uighur rebels. It also definitely 
wants to avoid allowing Pakistan to force it into 
a nuclear confrontation with India. It criticises 
Western  involvement  in  Afghanistan  and  the 
presence of US bases there, but not too much, 
as instability on its western Marches is not in its 
interest  and  it  wants  to  import  increasing 
quantities  of  the  country’s  raw  materials. 
Chinese  engineers  and  workers  are  already 
working in several Afghan mines. 
 
Saudi Arabia Defends Conservatism and 
the Sunnis 
The  Kingdom  of  Saudi  Arabia  (KSA)  remains 
one  the  main  players  in  the  Afghan  theatre. 
Other  than  Pakistan,  which  invented  it,  the 
kingdom was the only state that recognised the 
Taliban  regime,  and  since  the  US  toppled  the 
Taliban  in  2001  its  financial  support  has 
continued to come from the KSA. 
 
From  the  Saudi  perspective,  the  Taliban,  as  a 
Sunni  organisation  in  a  country  divided 
between the two main Muslim denominations 
and as the country’s spearhead of political and 
religious  conservatism,  needs  to  play  an 
important  role  in  Afghanistan’s  future.  Its 
Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the 
Prevention  of  Vice,  which  the  West  derided 
when the Taliban established it while in power, 
continues to function today in the KSA, with 
similar objectives although less brutal methods. 
 
The KSA has, furthermore, long been a strong 
advocate of Afghan reconciliation, an idea that 
the West has also recently started to promote. 
It has viewed the political elimination of the 
Taliban  that  the  West  has  sought  to  be 
contrary to its interests, as that would increase 
the  influence  of  its  Shiite  rival  Iran  and 
facilitate  the  rise  of  Sufism  and  other 
unorthodox sects in South Asia. 
 
Russia Fears Terrorism and Heroin 
Russia  needs  a  buffer  zone  between  its 
Marches in Central Asia and the Middle East. 
Its main objective in regard to Afghanistan is 
to contain the potential sources of contagion 
that  could  spread  terrorism  into  Uzbekistan 
and Kyrgyzstan and from there into the North 
Caucasus. Its preferred future scenario is for 
NATO to stabilise the country and the US to 
withdraw  its  bases  quickly  from  Afghanistan 
and Central Asia. Its second choice would be 
for the conflict to become bogged down and 
for the West to remain in place, keeping the lid 
on the Islamists and violent drug traffickers. 
 
This  second  scenario  would  also  have  the 
advantage  of  satisfying  its  prophecy  that 
NATO would be unable to pacify Afghanistan 
with only half the troops that the Soviet Union 
and its allies had there. The Russian leadership 
also knows, however, that international politics 
is no longer a zero-sum game and that it has 
become  too  risky  to  celebrate  their 
competitors’  misfortunes.  Russia  would  have 
much to lose if the ISAF failed completely, so 
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of  its  military  and  political  elites  criticising  it. 
Russia’s collaboration with the ISAF, however, 
is  neither  enthusiastic  nor  devoid  of  ulterior 
motives, but it does at least collaborate in the 
transit of supplies through its territory. 
 
Like India and unlike Pakistan and China, the 
Russian government is sceptical and suspicious 
about the possibility of reconciliation with the 
Taliban.  It  considers  that  its  possible 
participation  in  peace  talks  would  be  only  a 
tactical manoeuvre, and that its ultimate goal is 
still to overthrow the current government. 
 
Russia’s other major concern is to contain the 
trafficking of heroin from Afghanistan. Russia’s 
consumption of Afghan heroin, estimated to be 
70 tons per year, compared to 88 tons in the rest 
of  Europe  combined,  has  become  a  national 
scourge. Its government would like the Afghan 
government’s efforts to combat drug trafficking 
to be more effective and to be one of the tasks 
included  in  the  ISAF  mandate.  This  position 
brings  the  country  into  a  position  similar  to 
Iran’s,  another  major  victim  of  the  flow  of 
heroin exported from its eastern neighbour. 
 
Iran: A Game of Balancing 
The  Iranian  leadership’s  objectives  in 
Afghanistan  are  complex.  It  maintains  Iran’s 
traditionally close linguistic, ethnic, and religious 
ties  with  the  Tajiks,  especially  the  Hazaras. 
Iranian  influence  being  strong  mainly  in 
Afghanistan’s North and West brings it naturally 
into competition with the Taliban, Pashtun, and 
– violently – with anti-Shiite elements as well. A 
Taliban  massacre  of  Iranian  diplomats  and 
Hazara people led both countries to the brink of 
war in 1998. Like Russia, Iran is funding many 
northern  initiatives,  creating  relatively  durable 
political  coalitions,  media  groups,  MP  lobbies, 
and shuras of all kinds. 
 
At the same time, however, the Revolutionary 
Guard  Corps  also  provides  the  Taliban  with 
moderate support, as Iran’s leadership considers 
it  to  be  in  its  interest  to  help  maintain  the 
Afghan  conflict  in  order  to  ensure  having  a 
means of pressurizing the US. In the event of 
armed conflict with the Americans the Taliban 
would  become  automatic  allies.  The  Iranians 
also doubt the influence and the sustainability 
of the government of President Karzai, their 
nominal  ally,  and  need  to  maintain  some 
working understanding with the local Taliban, 
especially  in  their  struggle  against  massive 
immigration  from  Afghanistan,  against  their 
own  Baluchi  rebels,  and  against  the  heroin 
trade. 
 
Afghan Opinions 
The  Taliban  has  organised  or  preserved  a 
parallel administration in much of Afghanistan 
that after dark more often than not has greater 
authority than the one in Kabul, with shadow 
governors in all of the provinces and most of 
the  districts.  It  has  also  freely  distributed 
effective  and  terrifying  threats  called  night 
letters.  
 
Socio-politically,  it  openly  wants  to  return 
Mullah Omar, the Emir of the Faithful, to a 
guardian  tutelary  role  supervising 
Afghanistan’s  state  activities.  Its  platform  is 
moral  rather  than  managerial.  It  hardly 
bothered to administer the country when it ran 
it alone from 1996 to 2001, so it is unlikely that 
it  would  suddenly  become  concerned  with 
administration.  
 
If  it  were  to  join  the  government  it  would 
probably claim one or two of such symbolic 
portfolios as justice or holy pilgrimage and use 
these to defend its principles, something that 
most southern Afghans would probably prefer 
to  the  current  government’s  corruption  and 
inefficiency. It would do everything it could to 
prohibit girls from going to school, clinics, or 
work outside the home. It would work to slow 
down Westernisation and modernisation, and 
probably  be  most  successful  at  this  in  its 
Pashtun stronghold, especially in rural areas. It 
would maintain its strong moral conservatism,   6 
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advocating a somewhat theocratic purification of 
society, a return to the mythic historical values 
of  the  Qur’an,  and  the  application  of  the 
Pashtun  code  of  honour,  the  Pashtunwali.  It 
would  work  to  end  the  promotion  of  human 
rights, freedom of the press, and democratic and 
electoral  parliamentarianism  as  sources  of 
impiety. 
 
It  is  likely  that  with  the  test  of  power  and 
frequent  interaction  with  more  cosmopolitan 
politicians  the  more  moderate  among  the 
Taliban’s members would take control of it. It is 
also likely that, having had its fingers burnt, the 
Taliban  will  roughly  fulfil  its  current 
commitment  not  to  support  transnational 
terrorism  again.  They  will  not  support  or 
provide  shelter  for  international  terrorist 
networks  but  in  exceptional  and  sporadic 
circumstances.  
 
In  regard  to  the  intractable  controversy  about 
the  constitution,  it  is  conceivable  that  the 
Taliban would tolerate the present one as long as 
the  government  does  not  actually  enforce  its 
articles  addressing  human  rights.  It  might  also 
permit  the  maintenance  of  some  US  bases,  as 
many of the people in the North prefer, on the 
condition  that  they  function  with  great 
discretion and outside Pashtun territory. 
 
Most analysts, however, consider the Taliban to 
have little or no sincere interest in participating in 
power.  It  would,  as  with  the  communists  and 
fascists in the early twentieth century, enter into 
a  coalition  exclusively  with  the  hope  of  soon 
supplanting  the  other  members  and  taking 
complete power. 
 
The  very  prospect  of  reconciliation  talks  has 
made the ethnic groups that form the majority 
of  the  population  in  northern  and  central 
Afghanistan, which are the Uzbeks, Tajiks, and 
Hazaras, extremely nervous. They have much to 
lose  should  foreign  troops  leave.  The  massive 
foreign  presence  currently  allows  them  to 
dominate the army and, to a large extent, the 
government,  and  also  to  maintain  a  certain 
pace of social progress. They know that they 
would  lose  much  influence  in  the  governing 
structures  if  the  Pashtuns,  who  are  more 
ferocious  warriors,  and  among  them  the 
Taliban,  who  are  more  efficient  ideologues, 
were once again to guide the country. 
 
The warlords of today, Taliban and otherwise, 
will almost undoubtedly continue to dominate 
their  valleys  and  do  so  to  an  even  greater 
extent once most of the foreign troops have 
left, justifying this by citing the corruption and 
various  moral  perversions  that  have 
characterised the central government in Kabul. 
 
To  complete  this  picture  of  Afghanistan’s 
prospects it would be helpful to describe some 
sort of detalibanised Pashtun perspective, but 
even the most expert observers find this to be 
extremely  difficult  to  envision.  The  Taliban 
physically  eliminated  the  maliks  and  other 
traditional leaders who did not show allegiance 
to  them.  The  president’s  family  network, 
bringing together the Durrani subtribe – and 
especially  the  Populzaï  clan,  today  the 
country’s  foremost  economic  operator  after 
the ISAF – is robust. It is likely, however, that 
only its relocated branches in Dubai and the 
US will survive the current president, and little 
alternative leadership is available.  
 
Pending  a  Pashtun  reconfiguration  following 
the  departure  or  death  of  President  Karzai, 
Emir Omar, or both, it is only possible to list 
the  ethnic  group’s  enduring  cultural 
characteristics.  The  Pashtuns  will  remain 
hyper-conservative,  anti-globalisation, 
irredentist,  generous,  hospitable,  spirited, 
vengeful,  valuers  of  honour  and  bravery, 
people  who  prefer  consensual  collective 
decisions  made  in  tribal  assemblies  of  elders 
called  jirga,  concerned  about  their  hegemony 
over the Afghan state, deniers of the Pakistani 
state’s legitimacy, and incorrigible smugglers of 
all manner of goods.   7   
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Ten  years  ago  Hamid  Karzaï  seemed  to 
symbolise a unifying ideal. Today he essentially 
monitors assets and patrimony. Like most of his 
colleagues  in  South  Asia  his  priority  is  not  to 
manage the state, develop the country, or build 
an  administration.  He  maintains  an  overall 
balance and tries to unify. His repeated calls for 
a  cessation  of  hostilities  seem  sincere,  but  he 
does little to implement them.  
 
Considering all these scenarios for Afghanistan’s 
future, it seems reasonable to assume that it will 
remain allergic to any kind of centralisation in 
Kabul, as well as to foreign domination. It will 
remain the realm of insolence. Local potentates 
– who mostly call themselves mujahideen, recalling 
the  glorious  times  of  the  struggle  against  the 
Soviets,  when  no  rift  existed  between  the 
Taliban and others – are the only ones assured 
of  retaining  their  privileges  and  even 
strengthening them. The strong, centralised state 
about which the State Department dreamed in 
2002  has  not  yet  seen  even  the  first  steps  of 
possible implementation. 
 
Compromises will inevitably take place between 
Taliban  intransigence  and  Western  modernity 
and  between  regions  and  ethnic  groups.  The 
country  and  its  neighbours  will  undoubtedly 
remain  major  concerns  for  the  international 
community  for  a  long  time.  The  West’s 
challenge  will  be  to  orchestrate  its  troops’ 
departure  in  such  a  way  that  they  will  avoid 
having  to  return  soon  in  more  complicated 
circumstances. It is now too early to assess if the 
Turkish  attempt  to  convene  a  regional 
conference  that  would  formalise  permanent 
compromises among all the ambitions of the 
country’s  influential  neighbours  will  be 
successful. We should welcome this endeavour 
and its objectives, which are a series of specific 
commitments  with  the  purpose  of  making 
Afghanistan  again  a  place  for  commercial 
transit and fruitful trade instead of the zone of 
confrontation for hegemonies that it has been 
for at least two centuries. 
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